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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal calls upon us to clarify our recent holding 
in United States v. Holifield, 53 F.3d 11 (3d Cir. 1995), in 
which we addressed the question of a district court's discretion 
to impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence under section 
5G1.3(c) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.  In 
Holifield, we held that "although the district court must 
calculate the `reasonable incremental punishment' according to 
the [sentencing guidelines'] methodology, it need not impose that 
penalty.  Id. at 16-17.  Today, we reaffirm that a district court 
must determine the Guidelines' suggested "reasonable incremental 
punishment" according to the commentary's methodology.  The 
imposition of the commentary's suggested penalty, however, 
remains within the district court's discretion.  We further hold 
that, a court may impose a different penalty or employ a 
different method for determining what constitutes a reasonable 
incremental punishment as long as it indicates its reasons for 
imposing the penalty in such a way as to allow us to see that it 
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has considered the methodology.  In this case, the district court 
performed the calculations necessary to determine the Guideline's 
suggested penalty and provided sufficient reasons for imposing a 
different penalty.  The order of the district court, therefore, 
will be affirmed.  
I. 
 The facts of this case are undisputed.  From 1988 until 
his arrest in 1991, Paul Spiers embarked upon a veritable one man 
crime spree through three states. 
 The offenses at issue began in New Jersey on August 10, 
1988, when Spiers approached a teller at a branch of First 
Fidelity Bank in Newark, New Jersey.  Spiers handed the teller a 
note that read, "Hand me your $100.  $50.  $20 or your gonna die! 
right where you stand [sic] Try anything unordinary and your 
gonna see a real blood bath but you'll be First."  (Presentence 
Report ¶ 10) ("PSR") (emphasis in original).  Spiers then told 
the teller that she would die if she did not follow his 
instructions.  The teller obeyed and Spiers left the bank with a 
total of $6,800.  On May 25, 1989, Spiers entered a Hudson City 
Savings Bank branch, also in Newark, New Jersey.  This time he 
included a small bullet with the note he slipped the teller.  The 
note read "[p]ass me all your $50 or I am gonna shoot everyone 
here quick."  (PSR ¶ 23).  Spiers walked away from this robbery 
with $1,163. 
 Spiers then made his way to Pennsylvania, where he 
robbed the Dauphin Deposit Bank in Harrisburg.  This robbery 
began on the evening of May 2, 1991, when Spiers tested the 
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bank's perimeter security system.  When there was no response, he 
broke a window, entered the bank and laid in wait until morning. 
When the first employee entered, Spiers put a gun to her head and 
commanded her to open the bank's vault.  When she said that she 
was unable, he made her sit at a desk while training his gun upon 
her.  He then told her that "[i]f you make a move you can forget 
it cause I will kill you."  (PSR ¶ 13).  While they waited for 
other employees to arrive, Spiers questioned her about the bank's 
alarm system and the contents of the vault. 
 After the second employee arrived, Spiers grabbed her 
from behind and placed both employees in the bank's ladies room. 
The second employee informed him that the alarm would be shut off 
at 7:30 a.m.  (PSR ¶ 14).  A third employee arrived, and Spiers 
placed him in the ladies room with the others as well.  When the 
fourth employee entered and Spiers confronted her, she screamed. 
Spiers then asked her when the vault would be open; she answered 
that it would be open at 7:40 a.m.  Since this was inconsistent 
with the other employee's answer (7:30 a.m.), Spiers stated "I 
guess we're going to have to play Russian Roulette."  (PSR ¶ 16). 
He then proceeded to hold his gun to the back of each employee's 
head asking them when the vault would be open.  They all 
responded 7:30 a.m. 
 When 7:30 a.m. arrived, Spiers had the employees shut 
off the alarm, open the vault, and fill two bags with the money 
from the vault.  After the bags were filled, he forced the 
employees into a small bathroom.  When a fifth employee entered, 
he forced her into the bathroom as well.  Spiers then blocked the 
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door and sprayed the room with mace.  Spiers left the bank with a 
total of $225,550. 
 A few months later, October 2, 1991, Spiers was found 
ransacking a room at the Masters Inn in Little Rock, Arkansas. 
Spiers had signed-in under the name "Keith Whitfield."  When a 
desk clerk asked him to leave, Spiers became angry and began 
arguing with the clerk.  The security officer, an off-duty police 
officer, arrived and identified himself.  The officer then 
ordered Spiers to "put [his] hands up."  In response, Spiers 
brandished a 9mm semi-automatic pistol.  (PSR Addendum II ¶ 2A). 
During the ensuing struggle, Spiers pointed the gun at the clerk 
as well.  When Spiers eventually overpowered the officer, he 
cocked the gun and placed it to the officer's chest telling him 
to back up or he would shoot.  (PSR Addendum II ¶ 2A).  After 
demanding the officer's gun, he fled.  Later that day, the police 
found an abandoned 1983 Oldsmobile in a local park.  A search of 
the car uncovered a 9mm semi-automatic pistol, crack cocaine, and 
a wallet with identification in the name of Keith Whitfield. 
 One month later, Arkansas police spotted Spiers driving 
a 1990 Chevrolet that matched the description of a car stolen in 
Little Rock.  When they attempted to stop Spiers, a chase ensued. 
During the chase, Spiers pulled of the road to hide in an 
equipment shed.  When police officers attempted to block his 
exit, Spiers rammed the police officers' vehicle.  The officers 
then ordered him to desist and surrender.  Spiers once again 
rammed their vehicle.  The officers then disabled Spiers' vehicle 
by firing into the tires, and Spiers surrendered.  During his 
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arrest, Spiers identified himself as Keith Whitfield.  (PSR 
Addendum II ¶ 2B). 
 While being transported from a county jail to a local 
hospital for a medical evaluation and treatment, Spiers attempted 
an escape.  Spiers overpowered his custodial officer in the 
hallway of the medical facility, and took her service revolver. 
He then pointed the gun at her demanding the keys to her police 
car.  When she attempted to stall for time, Spiers fired a shot 
above her head.  He then searched her and found the keys to his 
ankle cuffs.  Spiers then ordered her to give him her gun belt, 
radio, and raincoat, and the officer complied.  (PSR Addendum II 
¶ 3A). 
 Fleeing from the hospital, Spiers encountered a man and 
woman getting out of a 1967 Ford.  Using the officer's gun, 
Spiers stole their vehicle and sped away.  He eventually crashed 
the car and fled on foot.  (PSR Addendum II ¶ 3B).  Spiers then 
broke into a two-story brick house where he held the occupants of 
the house, a husband and wife, hostage.  Using the stolen police 
radio, Spiers told the police that he was actually holding four 
hostages, and demanded that he be able to speak to a Linda 
Jackson and a Gerald McNair.  (PSR Addendum II ¶ 3C).  After 
approximately three hours, Spiers surrendered. 
 Spiers was subsequently convicted in Arkansas of 
battery, robbery, escape, theft of property (two counts), 
burglary, and kidnapping.  (PSR ¶ 63).  He was sentenced to 
prison for fifty years.  (PSR ¶ 66).  Under this sentence, the 
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first day Spiers would be eligible for parole is February 1, 
2004. 
 On August 3, 1993, Spiers was indicted in the District 
of New Jersey on two counts of bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113) 
for the robberies of First Fidelity and Hudson City Savings Bank. 
Spiers was then indicted in the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
on one count of bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113) for the robbery 
of the Dauphin Deposit Bank.  The Pennsylvania indictment was 
later transferred to New Jersey. 
 Spiers pleaded guilty to Count One of the New Jersey 
indictment and Count One of the Pennsylvania indictment.  (PSR 
¶ 5).  Pursuant to the plea agreement, the district court 
dismissed all other counts. 
 Spiers' sentencing hearing was adjourned twice to allow 
the parties and the probation office to submit memoranda on the 
application of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3.  App. at 37-46, 62-84.  After 
hearing argument, the court initially determined that the 
sentencing range for the federal crimes alone was 97 to 121 
months.  The court concluded that pursuant to section 5G1.3, if 
it were to treat the Arkansas offenses as federal offenses and 
group them with the federal crimes, the total punishment range 
under the guideline for both the state and federal offenses would 
be 135 to 168 months.  The court then declined to impose the 
sentencing guidelines' suggested penalty because the "interests 
of justice would not be served by following the methodology 
suggested by the hypothetical guideline range."  App. at 154-55. 
The court found that the calculated range was "permeated with 
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questionable variables . . . ."  App. at 137.  There were many 
factors, such as victim impact information and whether Spiers 
recklessly created substantial risks of death to his victims, 
which might increase a hypothetical federal sentence.  Moreover, 
Spiers' crimes and behavior were "shocking;" and "[s]ociety 
deserves to be protected against the behavior that [Spiers] 
engaged in."  App. at 156.  Consequently, the court found that 
Spiers did not "deserve" a concurrent sentence, and ordered him 
to serve a 110-month federal sentence to run consecutively from 
the completion of his Arkansas state sentence.  App. at 157. This 
appeal followed. 
II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Although our review of 
the construction of the Sentencing Guidelines is plenary, 
Holifield, 53 F.3d at 13, a district court's decision to impose a 
consecutive or concurrent sentence is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Nottingham, 898 F.2d 390, 393 (3d 
Cir. 1993). 
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III. 
 In United States v. Holifield, we stated the under 18 
U.S.C. § 3584,1 a sentencing court has the discretion to order a 
defendant's sentence to run either concurrently or consecutively 
to another undischarged term of imprisonment.  53 F.3d at 13. 
This discretion, however, is "subject to section 5G1.3 of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines," id., including the policy 
statements and commentary contained in the guidelines which are 
binding on the federal courts.  See, e.g., Stinson v. United 
States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1919 (1993) (commentary "must be given 
`controlling weight unless . . . plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent'" with the guidelines); Williams v. United States, 
503 U.S. 193, 201 (1992) (policy statements serve as "an 
authoritative guide to the meaning of the applicable Guideline"). 
 Section 5G1.3(c) requires that a defendant's sentence 
shall be imposed to run consecutively with an undischarged state 
sentence "to the extent necessary to achieve a reasonable 
incremental punishment for the instant offense."  U.S.S.G. 
§ 5G1.3(c) (1994).  According to the commentary: 
In some circumstances, such incremental 
punishment can be achieved by the imposition 
of a sentence that is concurrent with the 
remainder of the unexpired term of 
imprisonment.  In such cases, a consecutive 
sentence is not required.  To the extent 
                     
1
 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) provides: 
 
 If multiple terms of imprisonment are 
imposed on a defendant at the same time, or 
if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a 
defendant who is already subject to an 
undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms 
may run concurrently or consecutively . . . 
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practicable, the court should consider a 
reasonable incremental penalty to be a 
sentence for the instant offense that results 
in a combined sentence of imprisonment that 
approximates the total punishment that would 
have been imposed under § 5G1.2 (Sentencing 
on Multiple Counts of Conviction) had all of 
the offenses been federal offenses for which 
sentences were being imposed at the same 
time.  It is recognized that this 
determination will require an approximation. 
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 (commentary) (1994) (emphasis added).2  The 
commentary itself describes this methodology simply as a means 
"to assist the court in determining the appropriate 
sentence. . . .  Generally, the court may achieve an appropriate 
sentence through its determination of an appropriate point within 
the applicable guideline range for the instant federal offense 
combined with its determination of whether that sentence will run 
concurrently or consecutively to the undischarged term of 
imprisonment."  Id. 
 In Holifield, we held that while a district court must 
calculate the "reasonable incremental punishment" according to 
                     
2
 A question as to which version of the Guidelines -- 1990 or 
1994 -- applied was raised before the district court.  In 
sentencing Spiers, the district court followed the 1994 version 
and our interpretation of that version in Holifield.  The 
language used in the 1990 version of § 5G1.3 is even more 
permissive than the language found in the 1994 version.  The 
commentary provided that "[t]he court may consider imposing a 
sentence for the instant offense that results in a combined 
sentence that approximate the total punishment that would have 
been imposed under § 5G1.2 (Sentencing on Multiple Counts of 
Conviction) had all of the offenses been federal offenses for 
which sentences were being imposed at the same time."  U.S.S.G. 
§ 5G1.3 (commentary) (1990).  See United States v. Redman, 35 
F.3d 437, 440-441 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the history and 
evolution of § 5G1.3).  Since the district court's discretion is 
even greater under the 1990 version of the Guidelines, even if 
the use of the 1994 version of the Guidelines might have 
constituted error, such error would have been harmless. 
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the commentary's methodology, the imposition of that penalty, is 
within the district court's discretion.  53 F.3d at 16. 
("although the district court must calculate the `reasonable 
incremental punishment' according to the methodology, it need not 
impose that penalty.").  If the court imposes a different penalty 
or employs a different method for calculating the penalty, it 
must indicate its reasons for not employing the commentary 
methodology.  Id. at 16-17 ("the court may employ a different 
method in determining the sentence as long as it indicates its 
reasons for not employing the commentary method.").  As a result, 
when determining whether a defendant's sentence is to be 
consecutive or concurrent a district court must calculate section 
5G1.3's suggested penalty according to the Guidelines' 
methodology, and if it abandons that methodology and penalty, the 
court must state its reasons "in such a way as to allow us to see 
that it has considered the methodology."  Id. at 16 (quoting 
United States v. Redman, 35 F.3d at 441).  We, therefore, 
recognized that the commentary's suggested penalty is not the 
exclusive or authoritative definition of what constitutes a 
reasonable incremental punishment, but merely an example that the 
district court must consider. 
 The majority of the circuits that have addressed this 
issue have also concluded that while a district court must 
consider the Guidelines' methodology, it need not follow it as 
long as it states its reasons for not doing so.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Hernandez, 64 F.3d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1995) ("If 
the district court chooses not to follow the methodology, it must 
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explain why the calculated sentence would be impracticable in 
that case or the reasons for using an alternate method."); United 
States v. Wiley-Dunaway, 40 F.3d 67, 72 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(remanding so the district court could "consider" § 5G1.3(c), but 
noting that the court "retains the right to depart from" the 
methodology); Redman, 35 F.3d at 441 ("True, the court must 
attempt to calculate the reasonable incremental punishment that 
would be imposed under the commentary methodology.  If that 
calculation is not possible or if the court finds that there is a 
reason not to impose the suggested penalty, it may use another 
method to determine what sentence it will impose.").  As the 
Second Circuit has stated, "[i]n sum, § 5G1.3(c) does not limit 
the district court's ultimate discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3584 
to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences.  It instead 
requires consideration of the basic principle that a consecutive 
sentence should be imposed to the extent that it will result in a 
reasonable incremental penalty and consideration of the 
Commission's preferred methodology for calculating such a 
penalty."  United States v. Whiteley, 54 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 
1995).3  We have joined the majority of circuits that leave the 
ultimate imposition of a concurrent or consecutive sentence to 
the sound discretion of the district court. 
                     
3
 The Second Circuit does not require the court to "employ 
the [commentary's] multi-count analysis approach or explain why 
it chose an alternative approach," provided the district court 
expressly considers § 5G1.3.  United States v. Lagatta, 50 F.3d 
125, 128 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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 The Eighth Circuit is the only circuit to reach a 
different result.  That court has held that if a methodology 
other than the one set forth in the commentary is used, the 
district court must conduct a departure analysis under the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  See United States v. Duranseau, 26 F.3d 
804, 810-11 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Brewer, 23 F.3d 
1317, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1994).  However, as the Ninth Circuit 
noted in Redman, 35 F.3d at 442, the doctrinal basis for that 
decision is the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. 
Gullickson, 981 F.2d 344, 346-48 (8th Cir. 1992), which was based 
upon the 1991 version of the Guidelines in which the methodology 
was mandatory.  The subsequent Eighth Circuit cases which have 
interpreted section 5G1.3(c) as imposing greater limits on a 
district court's discretion fail to take into account that both 
before and after the 1991 version of section 5G1.3(c), the 
commentary's methodology was and is permissive.  We, therefore, 
reject the conclusion that section 5G1.3(c) requires a district 
court to conduct a departure analysis if it chooses to impose a 
penalty other than the penalty suggested by the commentary's 
methodology. 
 Our decision in Holifield is particularly instructive 
in this case.  The defendant in Holifield had served 17 months 
out of a 21-month state sentence.  The district court concluded 
that for the federal offense, the Sentencing Guidelines required 
a sentencing range of 15 to 21 months.  The court then 
determined, pursuant to section 5G1.3, that under U.S.S.G. 
§ 5G1.2 the total sentence for the combined state and federal 
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offenses would have been 24 months.  The defendant argued that 
because the combined offense range was 24 months, section 5G1.3 
required the court to sentence him to either a 7-month concurrent 
term or a 3-month consecutive sentence.  The district court 
disagreed.  The court concluded that because the minimum sentence 
for the federal offense was 15 months, it "could have gone no 
lower except had I departed and, in fact, I see no circumstances 
that would have warranted departure nor have any been set forth." 
Holifield, 53 F.3d at 16.  We affirmed, noting that "[a]lthough 
the defendant did not receive a `combined sentence of 
imprisonment that approximates the total punishment that would 
have been imposed under § 5G1.2,' such a sentence could not have 
been imposed here without a departure from the guidelines.  As we 
have noted, such a departure is not required under § 5G1.3."  Id. 
 We concluded that even if the court had considered but 
rejected the application of the methodology, "we would reach the 
same result" because it listed sufficient reasons for imposing a 
different penalty.  Id. at 16-17.  First, the court "went through 
the methodology step-by-step."  Id. at 17.  Second, the court 
listed several factors that "warranted a more severe sentence," 
including:  that the defendant's prior offense had not been fully 
taken into account in determining the offense level for the 
instant offense; that most of the victims were elderly and the 
financial hardship caused by the defendant was probably 
"irremediable;" and that the defendant's conduct was "`parasitic 
and outrageous' and he had not shown any remorse for his 
actions."  Id.  We thus concluded that "although the district 
15 
court properly followed the § 5G1.3 methodology, we believe it 
also listed more than sufficient reasons for departing from that 
methodology if it had chosen to do so."  Id. 
A. 
 Spiers does not explicitly question this interpretation 
of Section 5G1.3.4  Instead, Spiers argues that the reasons 
offered by the district court when it rejected the suggested 
penalty are inadequate.  We disagree. 
 In this case, the district court clearly employed the 
commentary's multi-count analysis.  App. at 125-139.  After 
employing the methodology, the district court decided not to 
impose the suggested penalty.  In doing so, the court stated that 
"I have found that the interest of justice would not be served by 
following the methodology suggested by the hypothetical guideline 
range[]," App. 154-55; instead, the court concluded, a sentence 
of 110 months to run consecutively from the completion of the 
Arkansas state sentence was a reasonable incremental punishment 
for Spiers' federal crimes.  App. at 157.  Initially, the court 
expressed some concern that "many unknown variables continue to 
                     
4
 Rather, counsel for Spiers implicitly challenges our 
conclusion in Holifield that the decision to impose a consecutive 
or concurrent sentence remains within a district court's 
discretion.  At oral argument, Spiers suggested that the 
commentary's methodology was the only means for determining what 
constituted a reasonable incremental punishment.  This argument 
totally ignores the advisory nature of the commentary's policy 
statement.  The commentary's methodology is meant to aid district 
courts by suggesting what may be a reasonable incremental 
punishment.  It does not purport to provide the authoritative and 
exclusive definition of such a punishment.  Congress left that 
responsibility to the district courts in the sound exercise of 
their discretion.  See supra at 9-13. 
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exist" with the application of the commentary's methodology. App. 
at 135.  The court was concerned that it did not have many of the 
underlying facts of the state offenses which play an integral 
role in determining Spiers' sentence.  Included in these facts 
were victim-impact information, the degree of harm caused by 
Spiers during the various assaults, and the number of people 
potentially endangered during the various crimes.  App. at 
135-36.  If it had this information, the court expressed a belief 
that the sentencing range may be even higher, perhaps 151 to 181 
months.  App. at 137.5  As a result, the court clearly questioned 
the reliability of the commentary's methodology. 
 More importantly, the court determined that a 
concurrent sentence would be inconsistent with the interests of 
justice.  The district court considered Spiers various offenses a 
"reign of terror," referring to him as a veritable "menace to 
society" whose conduct endangered correctional officers, police 
officers, and "just pure people who try to go about their lives 
normally, not committing any crimes."  App. at 155.  In light of 
this, the district court concluded that Spiers simply did not 
deserve a concurrent sentence.  App. at 157.  According to the 
court, "I've taken a chance on some people in my lifetime as a 
sentencing judge, your record is so bleak, so bad, that I would 
                     
5
 Spiers argues that the court placed undue emphasis on the 
facts of the underlying state offenses.  (Appellant's Br. at 14). 
This argument fails to appreciate that the commentary's suggested 
methodology requires the district court to treat a defendant's 
state offenses as federal offenses in order to determine what the 
federal sentence would have been under § 5G1.2 had all the 
offenses been federal offenses.  U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 (commentary). 
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be making a horrible bet . . . .  You don't deserve it.  I want 
to be very, very candid and straight:  You don't deserve it.  No 
way."  App. at 156-57.  The district court ultimately concluded 
that a consecutive sentence would not only protect society from 
any potential future criminal behavior, App. at 156 ("Society 
deserves to be protected against the behavior that you've engaged 
in."), but would also ensure that Spiers was properly punished 
for his crimes.  App. at 157 ("I tried to impress upon you that 
the crimes which you pled guilty here to are not minor crimes. 
What you have sown you are now reaping."). 
 It is patently clear in this case that in deciding upon 
a consecutive sentence, the district court considered the nature 
and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristic 
of the offender, and the need for punishment and incapacitation. 
The statute which authorizes the imposition of concurrent or 
consecutive sentences specifically requires courts to consider 
these factors.  18 U.S.C. § 3584(b) ("The court, in determining 
whether the terms imposed are to be ordered to run concurrently 
or consecutively, shall consider, as to each offense for which a 
term of imprisonment is being imposed, the factors set forth in 
section 3553(a).").  United States v. Nottingham, 898 F.2d 390, 
393 (3d Cir. 1990).  Section 3553(a) provides in pertinent part 
that: 
. . .  The court in determining the 
particular sentence to be imposed, shall 
consider -- 
 
 (1) the nature of the circumstances of 
the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; 
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 (2) the need for the sentence 
imposed -- 
 
  (A)  to reflect the seriousness of 
the offense, to promote respect for the law, 
and to provide just punishment for the 
offense; 
 
  (B) to afford adequate deterrence 
to criminal conduct; 
 
  (C)  to protect the public from 
further crimes of the defendant . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  See also Lagatta, 50 F.3d at 128.  These 
factors are also reflected in the legislative history of U.S.S.G. 
5G1.3's enabling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(D) which states: 
in evaluating whether the sentences should 
run concurrently or consecutively, the court 
must consider the nature and circumstances of 
the offenses and the history and 
characteristics of the offense, the need for 
just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation, and the sentencing 
guidelines and any pertinent policy 
statements of the Sentencing Commission.  It 
is anticipated that in certain activities a 
purpose of incapacitation alone might warrant 
imposition of consecutive terms of 
imprisonment . . . . 
S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1984), reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3311.  In examining the nature of Spiers' 
conduct, his history, the need for just punishment and 
incapacitation, the court considered factors that it was required 
to consider by law, and concluded that given the nature of his 
conduct Spiers did not deserve a concurrent sentence, and that a 
consecutive sentence would best serve the interests of justice. 
The district court's reasons for declining to impose the 
commentary's suggested penalty, therefore, are sufficient. 
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 As the district court concluded in this case, a 
concurrent sentence would result in no incremental punishment at 
all, and would in effect give Spiers a "free ride" for his 
federal crimes.  As Spiers' state sentence was approximately 
thirty-five years longer than the penalty suggested by the 
commentary, unless the district court dramatically departed 
upward, the imposition of a concurrent sentence would not have 
added any incremental punishment for Spiers' federal offenses. As 
the Ninth Circuit stated, "the imposition of a sentence which 
added no increment for [a defendant's] federal offenses could not 
be called the addition of a reasonable increment.  Indeed, to say 
that a reasonable increment was zero would defy common sense and 
common usage.  It would amount to the reification of an 
oxymoron."  Redman, 35 F.3d at 442.  See also Lagatta, 50 F.3d at 
128 ("A concurrent sentence would serve none of these objectives, 
because it would have, in the words of the district court, given 
[the defendant] a `free ride.'").  As Spiers' does not challenge 
any of the district court's factual conclusions, we must conclude 
that the court acted within it discretion when it sentenced 
Spiers to serve a consecutive sentence of 110 months.  As the 
commentary itself recognizes, courts may generally achieve an 
appropriate sentence through a determination of an appropriate 
point within the applicable guideline range for the federal 
offense at issue, and a determination of whether that sentence 
will run concurrently or consecutively to the undischarged term 
of imprisonment.  See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 (commentary). 
B. 
20 
 Spiers' final argument is that the district court 
failed to make any determination as to exactly when his federal 
sentence would commence or what the court deemed the appropriate 
total sentence to be.  (Appellant's Br. at 19).  In other words, 
Spiers argues that the district court's sentence was 
impermissibly indeterminate.  This argument ignores two simple 
facts.  First, the district court determined exactly when Spiers' 
federal sentence would begin -- at the conclusion of his state 
sentence.  Second, the court also determined what the appropriate 
total sentence was -- a consecutive sentence of 110 months. 
Accordingly, Spiers knows both when his federal sentence will 
begin and how long it will last.  Inasmuch as Spiers does not 
dispute the district court's determination that a sentence of 110 
months falls within the proper range for his federal bank robbery 
offenses, his argument is reduced to a reiteration that the 
district court should have imposed a concurrent sentence, as 
becomes clear upon examination of how Spiers concludes that his 
federal sentence is impermissibly indeterminate. 
 Spiers' argues that because his state sentence is 
indeterminate, the district court's sentence amounts to 257 
months at the earliest or 417 months at the latest.  According to 
Spiers, both of these results are inappropriate because they 
exceed the commentary's suggested punishment.  (Appellant's Br. 
at 22).  This argument ignores the district court's rejection of 
the commentary's suggested punishment.  The commentary's 
suggested penalty is not a per se limit on the total amount of 
time Spiers may serve for his federal and state convictions.  It 
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is only a suggested penalty which the district court is free to 
reject.  Having rejected the commentary's suggested penalty, the 
district court retained the discretion to impose either a 
concurrent or consecutive sentence up to the maximum sentence for 
Spiers' federal convictions, in this case 121 months.  As 
discussed above, the district court's decision to reject the 
suggested penalty was within the sound exercise of its 
discretion.  Spiers' state sentence and federal sentence are 
therefore separate and independent penalties which cannot be 
aggregated.  His federal sentence, therefore, will not fluctuate 
in length from 257 months to 417 months depending upon the length 
of his state sentence.  The federal sentence will remain a 
constant 110 months.  The only uncertainty, the exact date at 
which that 110-month period will begin, is a variable beyond the 
district court's control. 
 Moreover, the case law Spiers relies upon simply does 
not apply in situations where the district court has departed 
from the commentary's suggested methodology.  In support of his 
indeterminacy argument, Spiers' cites United States v. Brewer, 23 
F.3d 1317 (8th Cir. 1994), and United States v. Yates, 58 F.3d 
542 (10th Cir. 1995).  Neither case supports the argument that 
Spiers' sentence was impermissible.  In both Brewer and Yates, 
the district courts adopted the Sentencing Guidelines' suggested 
punishments and then went on to establish estimates for 
completion of the state sentence without adequate evidence to 
show when those dates might be.  Because the court had adopted 
the suggested Guidelines' punishment, the aggregate duration of 
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the combined state and federal sentences was vital.  Without 
sufficient evidence as to the likely length of the state 
sentences, the sentences imposed by the district courts failed to 
guaranty that the defendants would receive a reasonable 
incremental punishment.  Thus, in both Brewer and Yates, the 
circuit courts vacated the sentences and remanded the cases for 
resentencing. 
 In this case, however, because the district court 
rejected the commentary's suggested penalty and instead 
determined that the reasonable incremental punishment for Spiers' 
federal crimes was a wholly consecutive sentence of 110 months, 
the indeterminate nature of Spiers' state sentence will in no way 
affect and has no bearing on the duration of his federal 
sentence.  There is no need, therefore, for the district court to 
have made a finding of the likely length of Spiers' Arkansas 
state sentence. 
 Finally, Spiers' argument that the uncertainty of the 
exact day that his federal sentence will begin renders the 
sentence infirm simply proves too much.  The actual date upon 
which practically any consecutive sentences will take effect is 
uncertain.  By definition, a consecutive sentence begins when the 
prior sentence is completed.  There are many factors, including 
the defendant's behavior during incarceration, the decisions of a 
parole board, the possibility of an executive pardon or a 
successful appeal, and even prison conditions, which might 
determine when a defendant will complete his or her sentence. 
Because these factors are all beyond a sentencing court's 
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control, the sentencing court will never know and can never 
determine with any degree of certainty the exact date a defendant 
will complete any given sentence.  We know of no principle of law 
that requires a court to attempt such an exercise in futility; 
nor do we know of any principles that render a consecutive 
sentencing void or unjust based upon the resulting indeterminacy. 
As long as the defendant has adequate notice that a consecutive 
sentence may be imposed, a failure to determine the exact 
calendar date upon which a consecutive sentence is to begin does 
not deny the defendant due process of law.  Cf. Burns v. United 
States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991) (holding that a district court must 
notify the parties that it intends to upwardly depart from the 
sentencing range established by the Sentencing Guidelines); 
Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991) (holding that a defendant 
must have notice that the trial court might sentence him to 
death).  As the district court's decision to impose a wholly 
consecutive sentence was within the sound exercise of its 
discretion, the limited uncertainty created by the term of the 
underlying state sentence does not render the consecutive federal 
sentence infirm. 
IV. 
 For the forgoing reasons, the district court's order 
sentencing Spiers to 110 months to be served upon the completion 
of his undischarged state sentence will be affirmed. 
_________________________ 
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